ISAR is pleased to announce that its new monograph, ISAR’s Revolutionary Model Mandatory Spay/Neuter Statute is now available at its website, http://www.isaronline.org/, under Site Map/LAW/Monographs. (See our blog of Wednesday, July 2, 2008, for the Table of Contents). We encourage constructive comments.
Counting the six appendices—which provide extensive bibliographies of books, articles and statutes relating to mandatory spay/neuter, legal cases directly and indirectly on that subject, and a lengthy resource explaining the legislative process generally and how animal advocates can use it to achieve their goals—the monograph is 125 pages long. Interested persons are encouraged to download and/or print it, and they may reproduce the monograph in accordance with the permission conditions that appear on the copyright page.
The Introduction explains the context in which the monograph has been written, which is that mandatory spay/neuter “laws must be grounded not in hope, sentiment, or a benevolent opinion of mankind, but rather in the world as we find it—a real world where companion animals are too often thought of as virtually inanimate objects, mere property to be used and abused by humans.”
Part A, “The Policy Component of the Companion Animal Overpopulation Problem,” establishes the foundation premises upon which rest the remainder of the monograph: that there is today a huge national problem of companion animal overpopulation (Chapter I), that at present the only way to ameliorate it is through spay/neuter (Chapter II), and that these medical procedures must be made mandatory (Chapter III).
Part B, “The Legal Component of the Companion Animal Overpopulation Problem,” is necessarily the next consideration because if spay/neuter is to be mandatory, statutes of state-wide application will have to be enacted. To understand fully ISAR’s Revolutionary Model Mandatory Spay/Neuter Statute and the philosophy that underlies it, an analysis is necessary of existing spay/neuter statutes (Chapter IV). Only against that background can ISAR’s model statute be understood and appreciated (Chapter V). Once one is talking statutes, inevitably the question of constitutionality or unconstitutionality arises, a crucial consideration for mandatory spay/neuter legislation (Chapter VI). Finally, once the constitutional hurdle is surmounted, other related issues arise (Chapter VII): For purposes of enforcement and otherwise, how to identify all companion animals; low-cost spay/neuter for the indigent; early-age spay/neuter; Departments of Animal Affairs.
Part C, “The Legislative Component of the Companion Animal Overpopulation Problem,” reveals how even the worst alleged “mandatory spay/neuter” statutes can be subverted by politicians, as recently occurred in California (Chapter VIII). As an antidote to fruitless lobbying and craven legislators, ISAR presents a powerful resource for animal advocates who seek to maximize their chance of getting legislation introduced and enacted (Chapter IX).
Part D, “Morality and Spay Neuter” (Chapter X) makes the case that animal protection, and mandatory spay/neuter as one element in accomplishing that task, is at root a moral issue. The chapter concludes with the thought that “[a]s ISAR’s national billboards beseech the public: “Spay/Neuter: It Reduces the Killing.”
Friday, July 11, 2008
Monday, July 7, 2008
The Case Against Zoos
There are many arguments against the existence of zoos, and there are many articles and some books that make a convincing case for their closure. (Among the latter is Peter Batten’s Living Trophies.) Some, but by no means all, of those arguments are:
· Zoo animals are often acquired from dealers who, in turn, have obtained them by brutal means.
· They are transported to their destinations, often over great distances, in a primitive manner with little, if any, regard to what kind of treatment their species requires.
· They are subject to attacks by vandals, and even psychopaths.
· They are often held in sterile cells or cages, suffering the debilitating effects of solitary confinement.
· They receive inadequate nutrition, eating unpalatable synthetic food, and inadequate medical care, suffering illness and disease, because of zoos’ financial constraints and zookeepers’ indifference.
· They are traded like baseball cards among zoos and other animal exhibitors, to satisfy perceived display needs.
· They are cross-bred, creating animals called “tigons” or “ligers,” that are, Frankenstein-like, neither tigers or lions.
· They are denied the life dictated by their genes and nature.
These are but a few of the reasons zoos should cease to exist, and each of them have been elaborated at great length elsewhere.
But the most fundamental objection to zoos, understood and expressed by only a small segment of today’s animal rights movement, is that zoos are an immoral enterprise because they exploit and abuse living creatures for the entertainment of the crowd, and in so doing so cause and perpetuate immeasurable suffering.
Zoos are an outrageous affront to the nature and dignity of the animals imprisoned there. The humans who gawk at zoo inhabitants are co-conspirators in the crime perpetrated against the captive animals.
Why, then, do they exist?
Geordie Duckler has written incisively at 3 Animal Law 189 (1997) that:
Zoo animals are currently regarded as objects by the state and federal courts and are perceived as manifesting the legal attributes of amusement parks. The few tort [civil wrong] liability cases directly involving zoos tend to view them as markets rather than as preserves; the park animals are viewed as dangerous recreational machinery more akin to roller coasters or Ferris wheels than to living creatures. Courts typically treat zoo keepers and owners as mechanics and manual laborers responsible for the maintenance of these dangerous instrumentalities. Disputes concerning the possession, sale and care of exotic animals, as well as the administration of the habitats in which such animals are housed, have also been treated by the courts in terms of control of materials for public exhibit and entertainment.
Note the words that I have italicized, chosen carefully by Duckler to describe captive animals imprisoned in zoos: objects, machinery, instrumentalities, materials.
In other words, zoo animals, though living creatures, are nothing more than inanimate objects.
Consider that. Primates, large cats, the magnificent elephants are no different from chairs, cars, xrays, yarn.
How, one may ask, is this possible conceptually? How can animals, that breathe, eat, drink, sleep, walk, climb, run, copulate, fear, nurture, reproduce, be considered mere inanimate objects?
Putting aside bloody biblical texts, Greco-Roman barbarity, and the influential anti-animal views of Thomas Aquinas, the father of current prevailing attitudes about animals was renowned Christian philosopher-mathematician Rene Descartes. He held that animals were automatons—literally. Decartes asserted that lacking a Christian “soul,” they possessed no consciousness. Lacking a consciousness, he concluded, they experienced neither pleasure nor pain.
Decartes’s belief was a convenient one because it allowed him to rationalize the dissection of unanesthetized living creatures—all in the name of advancing the knowledge of anatomy.
If “advancing knowledge” as a rationale sounds familiar, let’s look at some of the major excuses, but certainly not legitimate justifications, for the existence of zoos today.
They supposedly “teach people about animals”—as the captive creatures pace interminably in cages, often in solitary confinement, or inhabit the same indoor/outdoor enclosure for life while humans throw them Cracker Jacks.
They allegedly “provide scientists an opportunity to study them”—while they no longer act as their genes and instinct drive them, neither seeking food nor roaming through natural habitats.
They presumably support “breeding programs,” especially of endangered species, both as an end in itself and to use the animals as barter with other zoos.
Even if these and other “practical” rationalizations for the existence of zoos were defensible, and they are not, none of them should be allowed to trump the fact that zoos are an immoral enterprise because they exploit and abuse living creatures for the entertainment of the crowd, and in so doing so cause and perpetuate immeasurable suffering.
Zoos are an outrageous affront to the nature and dignity of the animals imprisoned there. The humans who gawk at zoo inhabitants are co-conspirators in the crime perpetrated against the captive animals.
It is in the name of moral principle that zoos should be abolished, for the benefit of the captive “living trophies” and in the name of humane principle.
· Zoo animals are often acquired from dealers who, in turn, have obtained them by brutal means.
· They are transported to their destinations, often over great distances, in a primitive manner with little, if any, regard to what kind of treatment their species requires.
· They are subject to attacks by vandals, and even psychopaths.
· They are often held in sterile cells or cages, suffering the debilitating effects of solitary confinement.
· They receive inadequate nutrition, eating unpalatable synthetic food, and inadequate medical care, suffering illness and disease, because of zoos’ financial constraints and zookeepers’ indifference.
· They are traded like baseball cards among zoos and other animal exhibitors, to satisfy perceived display needs.
· They are cross-bred, creating animals called “tigons” or “ligers,” that are, Frankenstein-like, neither tigers or lions.
· They are denied the life dictated by their genes and nature.
These are but a few of the reasons zoos should cease to exist, and each of them have been elaborated at great length elsewhere.
But the most fundamental objection to zoos, understood and expressed by only a small segment of today’s animal rights movement, is that zoos are an immoral enterprise because they exploit and abuse living creatures for the entertainment of the crowd, and in so doing so cause and perpetuate immeasurable suffering.
Zoos are an outrageous affront to the nature and dignity of the animals imprisoned there. The humans who gawk at zoo inhabitants are co-conspirators in the crime perpetrated against the captive animals.
Why, then, do they exist?
Geordie Duckler has written incisively at 3 Animal Law 189 (1997) that:
Zoo animals are currently regarded as objects by the state and federal courts and are perceived as manifesting the legal attributes of amusement parks. The few tort [civil wrong] liability cases directly involving zoos tend to view them as markets rather than as preserves; the park animals are viewed as dangerous recreational machinery more akin to roller coasters or Ferris wheels than to living creatures. Courts typically treat zoo keepers and owners as mechanics and manual laborers responsible for the maintenance of these dangerous instrumentalities. Disputes concerning the possession, sale and care of exotic animals, as well as the administration of the habitats in which such animals are housed, have also been treated by the courts in terms of control of materials for public exhibit and entertainment.
Note the words that I have italicized, chosen carefully by Duckler to describe captive animals imprisoned in zoos: objects, machinery, instrumentalities, materials.
In other words, zoo animals, though living creatures, are nothing more than inanimate objects.
Consider that. Primates, large cats, the magnificent elephants are no different from chairs, cars, xrays, yarn.
How, one may ask, is this possible conceptually? How can animals, that breathe, eat, drink, sleep, walk, climb, run, copulate, fear, nurture, reproduce, be considered mere inanimate objects?
Putting aside bloody biblical texts, Greco-Roman barbarity, and the influential anti-animal views of Thomas Aquinas, the father of current prevailing attitudes about animals was renowned Christian philosopher-mathematician Rene Descartes. He held that animals were automatons—literally. Decartes asserted that lacking a Christian “soul,” they possessed no consciousness. Lacking a consciousness, he concluded, they experienced neither pleasure nor pain.
Decartes’s belief was a convenient one because it allowed him to rationalize the dissection of unanesthetized living creatures—all in the name of advancing the knowledge of anatomy.
If “advancing knowledge” as a rationale sounds familiar, let’s look at some of the major excuses, but certainly not legitimate justifications, for the existence of zoos today.
They supposedly “teach people about animals”—as the captive creatures pace interminably in cages, often in solitary confinement, or inhabit the same indoor/outdoor enclosure for life while humans throw them Cracker Jacks.
They allegedly “provide scientists an opportunity to study them”—while they no longer act as their genes and instinct drive them, neither seeking food nor roaming through natural habitats.
They presumably support “breeding programs,” especially of endangered species, both as an end in itself and to use the animals as barter with other zoos.
Even if these and other “practical” rationalizations for the existence of zoos were defensible, and they are not, none of them should be allowed to trump the fact that zoos are an immoral enterprise because they exploit and abuse living creatures for the entertainment of the crowd, and in so doing so cause and perpetuate immeasurable suffering.
Zoos are an outrageous affront to the nature and dignity of the animals imprisoned there. The humans who gawk at zoo inhabitants are co-conspirators in the crime perpetrated against the captive animals.
It is in the name of moral principle that zoos should be abolished, for the benefit of the captive “living trophies” and in the name of humane principle.
Wednesday, July 2, 2008
ISAR's Revolutionary Model Mandatory Spay/Neuter Statute
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction
A. The Policy Component of the Companion Animal Overpopulation
I. The nature and scope of the problem
II. The case for spay/neuter
III. Spay/Neuter of companion animals must be made mandatory
B. The Legal Component of the Companion Animal Overpopulation Problem
IV. Analysis and critique of existing mandatory spay/neuter statutes
V. Text and annotation of ISAR’s model mandatory spay/neuter statute
VI. Constitutionality of mandatory spay/neuter statutes
VII. Corollaries to mandatory spay/neuter statutes
C. The Legislative Component of the Companion Animal Overpopulation Problem
VIII. California’s worse than useless “mandatory” spay/neuter statute
IX. Successfully promoting animal protection legislation
D. The Moral Component of the Companion Animal Overpopulation Problem
X. Morality and mandatory spay/neuter
Appendices
1. Chapters I, II and III bibliography
III. Spay/Neuter of companion animals must be made mandatory
B. The Legal Component of the Companion Animal Overpopulation Problem
IV. Analysis and critique of existing mandatory spay/neuter statutes
V. Text and annotation of ISAR’s model mandatory spay/neuter statute
VI. Constitutionality of mandatory spay/neuter statutes
VII. Corollaries to mandatory spay/neuter statutes
C. The Legislative Component of the Companion Animal Overpopulation Problem
VIII. California’s worse than useless “mandatory” spay/neuter statute
IX. Successfully promoting animal protection legislation
D. The Moral Component of the Companion Animal Overpopulation Problem
X. Morality and mandatory spay/neuter
Appendices
1. Chapters I, II and III bibliography
2. State and municipal spay/neuter statutes
3. Proposed California “mandatory” spay neuter statute
4. State cases raising constitutional questions regarding animal-related legislation
5. Fiscal Impact of Cat and Dog Intake & Euthanasia in California Shelters
6. Table of Contents: Get Political for Animals and Win the Laws They Need
For more information about ISAR's Revolutionary Model Mandatory Spay/Neuter Statute, contact ISAR at contact@isaronline.org
Saturday, June 7, 2008
Vive Brigitte Bardot
Despite the promises of the French Revolution, France, like much of the world, has never had a First Amendment-like attachment to free speech.
Part of the explanation lies in xenophobia, especially regarding the United States. For example, some years back the French Parliament banned some 3,500 foreign words—including cheeseburger, chewing gum, and bulldozer—from use by advertisers, schools, corporations and the government.
Striking back at the use of mostly American/English words seen by many in France as having wounded that country’s “national pride,” the words—and thus the thoughts they represent—were interred in the graveyard of French political correctness.
So it should come as no surprise that in this day of uber-political correctness, especially in the Europe that is drowning in unassimilated Moslem immigrants, France has enacted “anti-racism” laws. They punish, criminally, speech which could incite hatred or discrimination on racial or religious grounds. These laws criminalize words on verboten topics.
We’ll put aside for now the wider issue of criminalizing pure speech, and what it says about a government that would enact such laws and about the citizenry that would stand still for it, and instead focus on the recent L’affaire Bardot.
Former actress Brigitte Bardot has for decades been France’s most vociferous voice for animal rights in that country and throughout the world. Fearless and eloquent, Mademoiselle (she will never be “Madame” to many of us) Bardot has been a lightening rod and target for France’s large anti-animal rights constituency.
Among them is the metastasizing Moslem invasion of Europe, which has brought with it Islam’s dietary and celebratory customs, including the ritual slaughter during religious holidays of conscious animals.
Two years ago, Bardot wrote a letter of protest to then-Interior Minister Nicholas Sarkozy, now president of France. She said “I’ve had enough of being led by the nose by this population that is destroying us, destroying our country by imposing its acts.”
For her exercise of free speech on behalf of animals Bardot was charged with a violation of the “incite hatred” law (she had been convicted of the same charge four times before).
The prosecutor wanted to send her to jail. Instead the judge fined Bardot the equivalent of $25,000, ordered that she pay about $1,500 to the “anti-racism” group that had complained about her letter, and required that Bardot reprint the judge’s order in the same place she had published her letter to Sarkozy.
Proudly unrepentant and undeterred, Bardot was quoted by her lawyer as saying “[s]he will not be silenced in her defense of animals.”
Thankfully, here in the United States animal rights activists do not exercise their free speech under threat of criminal punishment.
Because we don’t, we must applaud the courage of those who risk being branded as criminals in less enlightened countries like France.
According to the online Wikipedia encyclopedia, “the female depiction ‘Marianne,’ a national emblem of the French Republic, is, by extension, a personification of Liberty and Reason. It represents France, as a State, and its values . . . representing France as a nation and its history, land and culture. She is displayed in many places in France and holds a place of honor in town halls and law courts. She symbolizes the ‘Triumph of the Republic’, a bronze sculpture overlooking the Place de la Nation in Paris. Her profile stands out on the official seal of the country, is engraved on French euro coins and appears on French postage stamps; it also was featured on the former franc currency. Marianne is one of the most prominent symbols of the French Republic.”
Wikipedia also tell us that “[t]he official busts of Marianne, after having had [for many years] anonymous features, being represented by women of the people, began taking on the features of famous women starting in 1969”
The first French woman whose features appeared as Marianne, in 1969—“a personification of Liberty and Reason”—was Brigitte Bardot.
Part of the explanation lies in xenophobia, especially regarding the United States. For example, some years back the French Parliament banned some 3,500 foreign words—including cheeseburger, chewing gum, and bulldozer—from use by advertisers, schools, corporations and the government.
Striking back at the use of mostly American/English words seen by many in France as having wounded that country’s “national pride,” the words—and thus the thoughts they represent—were interred in the graveyard of French political correctness.
So it should come as no surprise that in this day of uber-political correctness, especially in the Europe that is drowning in unassimilated Moslem immigrants, France has enacted “anti-racism” laws. They punish, criminally, speech which could incite hatred or discrimination on racial or religious grounds. These laws criminalize words on verboten topics.
We’ll put aside for now the wider issue of criminalizing pure speech, and what it says about a government that would enact such laws and about the citizenry that would stand still for it, and instead focus on the recent L’affaire Bardot.
Former actress Brigitte Bardot has for decades been France’s most vociferous voice for animal rights in that country and throughout the world. Fearless and eloquent, Mademoiselle (she will never be “Madame” to many of us) Bardot has been a lightening rod and target for France’s large anti-animal rights constituency.
Among them is the metastasizing Moslem invasion of Europe, which has brought with it Islam’s dietary and celebratory customs, including the ritual slaughter during religious holidays of conscious animals.
Two years ago, Bardot wrote a letter of protest to then-Interior Minister Nicholas Sarkozy, now president of France. She said “I’ve had enough of being led by the nose by this population that is destroying us, destroying our country by imposing its acts.”
For her exercise of free speech on behalf of animals Bardot was charged with a violation of the “incite hatred” law (she had been convicted of the same charge four times before).
The prosecutor wanted to send her to jail. Instead the judge fined Bardot the equivalent of $25,000, ordered that she pay about $1,500 to the “anti-racism” group that had complained about her letter, and required that Bardot reprint the judge’s order in the same place she had published her letter to Sarkozy.
Proudly unrepentant and undeterred, Bardot was quoted by her lawyer as saying “[s]he will not be silenced in her defense of animals.”
Thankfully, here in the United States animal rights activists do not exercise their free speech under threat of criminal punishment.
Because we don’t, we must applaud the courage of those who risk being branded as criminals in less enlightened countries like France.
According to the online Wikipedia encyclopedia, “the female depiction ‘Marianne,’ a national emblem of the French Republic, is, by extension, a personification of Liberty and Reason. It represents France, as a State, and its values . . . representing France as a nation and its history, land and culture. She is displayed in many places in France and holds a place of honor in town halls and law courts. She symbolizes the ‘Triumph of the Republic’, a bronze sculpture overlooking the Place de la Nation in Paris. Her profile stands out on the official seal of the country, is engraved on French euro coins and appears on French postage stamps; it also was featured on the former franc currency. Marianne is one of the most prominent symbols of the French Republic.”
Wikipedia also tell us that “[t]he official busts of Marianne, after having had [for many years] anonymous features, being represented by women of the people, began taking on the features of famous women starting in 1969”
The first French woman whose features appeared as Marianne, in 1969—“a personification of Liberty and Reason”—was Brigitte Bardot.
Thursday, May 22, 2008
ISAR's "Harming Companion Animals" Monograph To Be Used In Law School "Animal Law And Rights" Course
Previous blogs (see May 8, 2008) have called readers's attention to the ISAR-produced monograph entitled "Harming Companion Animals: Liability and Damages."
Since its publication, the monograph has received considerable attention and has been used as a resource by animal custodians throughout the United States.
Recently, a lawyer who this summer will be teaching "Animal Law and Rights" at a New England law school asked for a copy of the monograph for use in his course. ISAR responded by offering him copies for all 25 of the students registered for the course, and he gladly accepted.
ISAR has additional copies in its inventory, and until we run out we'll make the same offer to any lawyer teaching an animal law course elsewhere.
Since its publication, the monograph has received considerable attention and has been used as a resource by animal custodians throughout the United States.
Recently, a lawyer who this summer will be teaching "Animal Law and Rights" at a New England law school asked for a copy of the monograph for use in his course. ISAR responded by offering him copies for all 25 of the students registered for the course, and he gladly accepted.
ISAR has additional copies in its inventory, and until we run out we'll make the same offer to any lawyer teaching an animal law course elsewhere.
Monday, May 12, 2008
ISAR and Animal Rights in Europe
Supporters of International Society for Animal Rights know that in recent years we have extended our humane education activities to many places outside the United States by "exporting" thousands of copies of our Reports and each August encouraging and assisting observance of our International Homeless Animals Day and candlelight vigils.
ISAR has looked beyond our shores because the awakening animal protection movements around the world are going to need all the help they can get, particularly in countries with no tradition of humane treatment of animals.
There is encouraging news:
- Three years ago, Great Britain barred hunting with dogs--although they are still allowed to follow the scent of foxes, but just not kill them.
- In Beijing where, as in the rest of China, people eat dog meat, restaurants have had a moratoriam imposed on the practice--although after the Olympics they will doubtless revert to this barbaric practice.
- Israel has barred the production of foie gras, as have some localities in Britain, and California has prohibited it--although the law is not effective until the year 2012.
- In Scotland, live animals may not be given as prizes, nor sold to children under the age of 16--although it is easy to see how the law will be circumvented.
- Hungary, Austria, Singapore, and Croatia have barred wild animals from circus acts--although the law apparently does not apply to domestic animals.
- Italy no longer allows animals to be used on television if they would be caused stressed or be forced to act against their nature--although the law's loopholes are evident.
- Bullfighting in Spain is under attack, with doping tests now conducted to ascertain if the doomed animals' useless attempts to defend themselves has been compromised and television no longer broadcasting the obscene spectacle--although without doping and TV broadcasts the fights continue.
- Four months from now a law goes into effect in Switzerland requiring dog owners to pay for and complete a two-part course focusing on the nature and needs of their animals--although holding wild animal in captivity goes on.
- Some medical schools in Russia have stopped what has been characterized as "the harmful use of animals"--although others have not, and experimentation has not been abolished.
ISAR is encouraged by these early steps toward animal protection because they stem from the growing awareness that took hold in the United States about a generation ago: that animals do have certain rights, and that it is arrogant and wrong for humans to abuse them.
Even though the current European laws leave a lot to be desired, they are a beginning--and ISAR intends to assist their proponents in strengthening and enlarging them.
We hope that our supporters realize, as we do, that animal protection seeds are sprouting all over the world--and that they need to be nurtured. With your help ISAR will keep working hard to do just that.
Wednesday, May 7, 2008
"Harming Companion Animals: Liability and Damages"
Last March, this Blog made brief mention of a monograph that ISAR has prepared for complimentary distribution, Harming Companion Animals: Liability and Damages. Because of the importance of the subject, we’re going to expand on that mention today.
Too often, especially with the advent of the Internet, advice is sought from ISAR by the custodians of companion animals about harm done to them by veterinarians through misdiagnosis, prescribing the wrong medicine, operating unnecessarily or not at all when they should, and committing every other kind of malpractice imaginable. We also receive heartbreaking reports of intentional acts of cruelty perpetrated against companion animals: dogs shot by neighbors, cats stoned by teenagers, horses maimed by sadists.
The media exposure now being given to the harm being visited upon companion animals understandably causes nightmares for their custodians, who live in fear their animals may be the next victims.
Given what is now known about the emotional aspects of the human animal bond, and how the millions of companion animal caretakers experience that bond, it’s not surprising that when harm is caused the custodian seeks some kind of recourse.
Often a complaint is made to prosecutors, the licensing authorities, or the Better Business Bureau. Sometimes newspaper announcements are placed, reporting what the wrongdoer did, or failed to do. Mostly, however, the reaction of choice is a lawsuit—usually not to recover damages for their own sake, but to expose the wrongdoer’s conduct, to prevent him from harming any animals in the future, and/or, sometimes, to punish him financially.
Once virtually unheard of, in the past two decades the number of civil lawsuits arising out of harm to companion animals has soared. Various reasons have been given for this phenomenon, among them the information explosion, a more litigious culture, a burgeoning literature on the subject, more lawyers willing to take such cases, the development of new theories on which to sue, a greater awareness of the importance of companion animals to their caretakers’ quality of life, and a greater willingness on the part of legislatures and courts to treat seriously the harm done to companion animals.
But to say that “the number of civil lawsuits arising out of harm to companion animals has soared,” is not to say that the litigation is succeeding. In fact, despite the occasional anecdotal story that makes the news-papers and a sound bite on local TV news, much of the litigation is not succeeding—not if success is measured by achieving the lawsuits’ primary goal: imposing a financial penalty on the wrongdoer so that his conduct will be deterred.
This is especially true of litigation triggered by veterinary malpractice, which is without question the source of most harm to companion animals.
Tactically, suing for veterinary malpractice is a good idea. But even if a veterinarian is found liable in a civil action, the damages are usually inconsequential because of the legal status of companion animals and the judicial system’s indifference to the value companion animals have to their custodians. Because of these two disabilities—animals as mere property, and their worth akin to inanimate objects—the cost to those who harm
companion animals is virtually nil.
In a malpractice case, if the veterinarian has the usual professional liability coverage, the insurance company, not the veterinarian, will pay the costs of the defense. If the plaintiff proves liability, the insurance company will pay, not the veterinarian.
But even if there is no insurance, or liability is imposed for conduct that the insurance does not cover (e.g., an intentional act), the damages the veterinarian has to pay will be relatively small. And to the extent that damages for harm to companion animals is minimal, there is less an incentive for a veterinarian and his staff to exercise the appropriate level of care.
It is a truism that generally people exercise care in direct proportion to their assessment of, and their willingness to incur, risk.
Most lawyers will be careful and not wait until the last day to file a notice of appeal. They appreciate the risk of disastrous consequences from a malpractice suit, if the notice of appeal is “out of time.” If the lawyer has malpractice insurance that has to pay a claim arising out of failure to timely file a notice of appeal, if he can even get malpractice insurance afterwards the company will likely raise his premium and his deductible.
But this disincentive to sloppy professional work because of either non-renewed coverage, or coverage at a higher cost, does not affect veterinarians. If their malpractice policies are not renewed and they are later found liable in a later case, the damages will usually be modest.
If veterinarians do have coverage and lose a malpractice case, the insurance company will pay the judgment and the increased premium, just as the initial premium, will be negligible.
Why is veterinary malpractice insurance so inexpensive?
The answer is obvious: The handful of awards in companion animal veterinary malpractice cases have been nowhere near the available policy liability limits because, since companion animals are considered mere “property,” their custodians cannot recover damages for their emotional loss, and pain and suffering, caused by the negligence or intentional harm.
Thus, as a practical matter, the insurance companies have little or no financial risk—especially if the award is within the policy’s deductible limit, which the insured veterinarian will invariably pay himself.
Damage awards will be nowhere near the available policy limits until our culture, legal and social alike, changes its basic attitude toward the nature of companion animals and their value to their human caretakers—an attitude rooted in outdated notions about both.
In the meantime, because the necessary change in values has not yet occurred, ISAR frequently receives reports of veterinary malpractice and intentional harm done to companion animals. Because these requests for information about what can be done to right these wrongs have so grown in number, it is no longer efficient for the ISAR to respond to them individually. Accordingly, ISAR has prepared Harming Companion Animals: Liability and Damages, an extensive monograph for complimentary distribution.
ISAR’s monograph is intended to be, and should be understood as, only educational in nature. It is not intended to constitute, and should not be considered, legal advice generally or for any individual situation in particular. When confronted with a legal problem regarding negligent or intentional harm to a companion animal, there is no substitute for face-to-face, fact-specific advice obtained from one’s own attorney. Accordingly, ISAR urges anyone with a potential or actual problem of this kind to consult a lawyer.
Moreover, Harming Companion Animals: Liability and Damages is not intended to be a comprehensive statement of the law on that subject. Its modest goal is to present merely general statements of the principal legal categories, using a single example to illustrate each.
Specifically, Harming Companion Animals: Liability and Damages focuses on the nature and scope of wrongdoers’ liability and the damages that may be recoverable from them. The monograph’s methodology is to present brief but thorough explanations of the applicable principles of liability and damages, and then to illustrate them by the use of extensive quotations from actual cases.
Although the monograph has not been written primarily for lawyers, the information contained in it should be of considerable value to them, especially our use of actual cases and our extensive bibliography, which includes:
• Law review articles.
• Law review notes.
• Book reviews.
• Books.
• International resources.
• Journals.
• Magazine articles.
• Miscellaneous resources.
• Newspaper articles.
• Online resources.
• Pending legislation.
• Unsuccessful bills.
• Currently existing statutes.
• Recently reported cases.
Complimentary copies of Harming Companion Animals: Liability and Damages may be obtained through our website, www.isaronline.org.
The monograph consists of two major parts. Part I deals with “liability” resulting from wrongful conduct. Someone must have done something either negligently or intentionally (or even through breach of contract) to cause harm to a companion animal. If there is liability, the second question, dealt with in Part II, is: what are the “damages”?
A final point: Even though most of the harm to companion animals results from
veterinary malpractice, Harming Companion Animals: Liability and Damages
should not be taken as a criticism (let alone a condemnation) of all veterinarians.
On the contrary.
Although among the thousands and thousands of veterinarians in the United States there are some bad apples—just as in the medical, legal, and all other professions—the vast majority of veterinarians and their staffs are caring, dedicated, competent, healers who feel deeply about the animals they treat. For them, all of us who share our lives with companion animals are eternally grateful.
Too often, especially with the advent of the Internet, advice is sought from ISAR by the custodians of companion animals about harm done to them by veterinarians through misdiagnosis, prescribing the wrong medicine, operating unnecessarily or not at all when they should, and committing every other kind of malpractice imaginable. We also receive heartbreaking reports of intentional acts of cruelty perpetrated against companion animals: dogs shot by neighbors, cats stoned by teenagers, horses maimed by sadists.
The media exposure now being given to the harm being visited upon companion animals understandably causes nightmares for their custodians, who live in fear their animals may be the next victims.
Given what is now known about the emotional aspects of the human animal bond, and how the millions of companion animal caretakers experience that bond, it’s not surprising that when harm is caused the custodian seeks some kind of recourse.
Often a complaint is made to prosecutors, the licensing authorities, or the Better Business Bureau. Sometimes newspaper announcements are placed, reporting what the wrongdoer did, or failed to do. Mostly, however, the reaction of choice is a lawsuit—usually not to recover damages for their own sake, but to expose the wrongdoer’s conduct, to prevent him from harming any animals in the future, and/or, sometimes, to punish him financially.
Once virtually unheard of, in the past two decades the number of civil lawsuits arising out of harm to companion animals has soared. Various reasons have been given for this phenomenon, among them the information explosion, a more litigious culture, a burgeoning literature on the subject, more lawyers willing to take such cases, the development of new theories on which to sue, a greater awareness of the importance of companion animals to their caretakers’ quality of life, and a greater willingness on the part of legislatures and courts to treat seriously the harm done to companion animals.
But to say that “the number of civil lawsuits arising out of harm to companion animals has soared,” is not to say that the litigation is succeeding. In fact, despite the occasional anecdotal story that makes the news-papers and a sound bite on local TV news, much of the litigation is not succeeding—not if success is measured by achieving the lawsuits’ primary goal: imposing a financial penalty on the wrongdoer so that his conduct will be deterred.
This is especially true of litigation triggered by veterinary malpractice, which is without question the source of most harm to companion animals.
Tactically, suing for veterinary malpractice is a good idea. But even if a veterinarian is found liable in a civil action, the damages are usually inconsequential because of the legal status of companion animals and the judicial system’s indifference to the value companion animals have to their custodians. Because of these two disabilities—animals as mere property, and their worth akin to inanimate objects—the cost to those who harm
companion animals is virtually nil.
In a malpractice case, if the veterinarian has the usual professional liability coverage, the insurance company, not the veterinarian, will pay the costs of the defense. If the plaintiff proves liability, the insurance company will pay, not the veterinarian.
But even if there is no insurance, or liability is imposed for conduct that the insurance does not cover (e.g., an intentional act), the damages the veterinarian has to pay will be relatively small. And to the extent that damages for harm to companion animals is minimal, there is less an incentive for a veterinarian and his staff to exercise the appropriate level of care.
It is a truism that generally people exercise care in direct proportion to their assessment of, and their willingness to incur, risk.
Most lawyers will be careful and not wait until the last day to file a notice of appeal. They appreciate the risk of disastrous consequences from a malpractice suit, if the notice of appeal is “out of time.” If the lawyer has malpractice insurance that has to pay a claim arising out of failure to timely file a notice of appeal, if he can even get malpractice insurance afterwards the company will likely raise his premium and his deductible.
But this disincentive to sloppy professional work because of either non-renewed coverage, or coverage at a higher cost, does not affect veterinarians. If their malpractice policies are not renewed and they are later found liable in a later case, the damages will usually be modest.
If veterinarians do have coverage and lose a malpractice case, the insurance company will pay the judgment and the increased premium, just as the initial premium, will be negligible.
Why is veterinary malpractice insurance so inexpensive?
The answer is obvious: The handful of awards in companion animal veterinary malpractice cases have been nowhere near the available policy liability limits because, since companion animals are considered mere “property,” their custodians cannot recover damages for their emotional loss, and pain and suffering, caused by the negligence or intentional harm.
Thus, as a practical matter, the insurance companies have little or no financial risk—especially if the award is within the policy’s deductible limit, which the insured veterinarian will invariably pay himself.
Damage awards will be nowhere near the available policy limits until our culture, legal and social alike, changes its basic attitude toward the nature of companion animals and their value to their human caretakers—an attitude rooted in outdated notions about both.
In the meantime, because the necessary change in values has not yet occurred, ISAR frequently receives reports of veterinary malpractice and intentional harm done to companion animals. Because these requests for information about what can be done to right these wrongs have so grown in number, it is no longer efficient for the ISAR to respond to them individually. Accordingly, ISAR has prepared Harming Companion Animals: Liability and Damages, an extensive monograph for complimentary distribution.
ISAR’s monograph is intended to be, and should be understood as, only educational in nature. It is not intended to constitute, and should not be considered, legal advice generally or for any individual situation in particular. When confronted with a legal problem regarding negligent or intentional harm to a companion animal, there is no substitute for face-to-face, fact-specific advice obtained from one’s own attorney. Accordingly, ISAR urges anyone with a potential or actual problem of this kind to consult a lawyer.
Moreover, Harming Companion Animals: Liability and Damages is not intended to be a comprehensive statement of the law on that subject. Its modest goal is to present merely general statements of the principal legal categories, using a single example to illustrate each.
Specifically, Harming Companion Animals: Liability and Damages focuses on the nature and scope of wrongdoers’ liability and the damages that may be recoverable from them. The monograph’s methodology is to present brief but thorough explanations of the applicable principles of liability and damages, and then to illustrate them by the use of extensive quotations from actual cases.
Although the monograph has not been written primarily for lawyers, the information contained in it should be of considerable value to them, especially our use of actual cases and our extensive bibliography, which includes:
• Law review articles.
• Law review notes.
• Book reviews.
• Books.
• International resources.
• Journals.
• Magazine articles.
• Miscellaneous resources.
• Newspaper articles.
• Online resources.
• Pending legislation.
• Unsuccessful bills.
• Currently existing statutes.
• Recently reported cases.
Complimentary copies of Harming Companion Animals: Liability and Damages may be obtained through our website, www.isaronline.org.
The monograph consists of two major parts. Part I deals with “liability” resulting from wrongful conduct. Someone must have done something either negligently or intentionally (or even through breach of contract) to cause harm to a companion animal. If there is liability, the second question, dealt with in Part II, is: what are the “damages”?
A final point: Even though most of the harm to companion animals results from
veterinary malpractice, Harming Companion Animals: Liability and Damages
should not be taken as a criticism (let alone a condemnation) of all veterinarians.
On the contrary.
Although among the thousands and thousands of veterinarians in the United States there are some bad apples—just as in the medical, legal, and all other professions—the vast majority of veterinarians and their staffs are caring, dedicated, competent, healers who feel deeply about the animals they treat. For them, all of us who share our lives with companion animals are eternally grateful.
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